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Abstract
In hypothesis testing, a false discovery occurs when a hypothesis is incorrectly rejected due to noise in
the sample. When adaptively testing multiple hypotheses, the probability of a false discovery increases as
more tests are performed. Thus the problem of False Discovery Rate (FDR) control is to find a procedure
for testing multiple hypotheses that accounts for this effect in determining the set of hypotheses to reject.
The goal is to minimize the number (or fraction) of false discoveries, while maintaining a high true positive
rate (i.e., correct discoveries).
In this work, we study False Discovery Rate (FDR) control in multiple hypothesis testing under the
constraint of differential privacy for the sample. Unlike previous work in this direction, we focus on the
online setting, meaning that a decision about each hypothesis must be made immediately after the test
is performed, rather than waiting for the output of all tests as in the offline setting. We provide new
private algorithms based on state-of-the-art results in non-private online FDR control. Our algorithms
have strong provable guarantees for privacy and statistical performance as measured by FDR and power.
We also provide experimental results to demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithms in a variety of data
environments.
1 Introduction
In the modern era of big data, data analyses play an important role in decision-making in healthcare,
information technology, and government agencies. The growing availability of large-scale datasets and ease of
data analysis, while beneficial to society, has created a severe crisis of reproducibility in science. In 2011,
Bayer HealthCare reviewed 67 in-house projects and found that they could replicate fewer than 25 percent,
and found that over two-thirds of the projects had major inconsistencies [oSEM19]. One major reason is
that random noise in the data can often be mistaken for interesting signals, which does not lead to valid and
reproducible results. This problem is particularly relevant when testing multiple hypotheses, when there is
an increased chance of false discoveries based on noise in the data. For example, an analyst may conduct 250
hypothesis tests and find that 11 are significant at the 5% level. This may be exciting to the researcher who
publishes a paper based on these findings, but elementary statistics suggests that (in expectation) 12.5 of
those tests should be significant at that level purely by chance, even if the null hypotheses were all true. To
avoid such problems, statisticians have developed tools for controlling overall error rates when performing
multiple hypothesis tests.
In hypothesis testing problems, the null hypothesis of no interesting scientific discovery (e.g., a drug has
no effect), is tested against the alternative hypothesis of a particular scientific theory being true (e.g., a drug
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has a particular effect). The significance of each test is measured by a p-value, which is the probability of the
observed data occurring under the null hypothesis, and a hypothesis is rejected if the corresponding p-value is
below some (fixed) significance level. Each rejection is called a discovery, and a rejected hypothesis is called a
false discovery if the null hypothesis is actually true. When testing multiple hypotheses, the probability of a
false discovery due to noise increases as more tests are performed. The problem of false discovery rate control
is to find a procedure for testing multiple hypotheses that takes in the p-values of each test, and outputs
a set of hypotheses to reject. The goal is to minimize the number (or fraction) of false discoveries, while
maintaining high true positive rate (i.e., correct discoveries).
In many applications, the dataset may contain sensitive personal information, and the hypothesis testing
procedure must be conducted in a privacy-preserving way. For example, in genome-wide association studys
(GWAS), a large number of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are tested for an association with a
disease simultaneously or adaptively. Previous work has shown that the statistical analysis of these datasets
can lead to privacy concerns, and it is possible to identify an individual’s genotype when only minor allele
frequencies are revealed [HSR+08]. The field of differential privacy [DMNS06] offers data analysis tools that
provide powerful worst-case privacy guarantees, and has become a de facto gold standard in privacy-preserving
data analysis. Informally, an algorithm that is ε-differentially private ensures that any particular output of
the algorithm is at most eε more likely when a single data point is changed. This parameterized privacy
notion allows for a smooth tradeoff between accurate analysis and privacy to the individuals who have
contributed data. In the past decade, researchers have developed a wide variety of differentially private
algorithms for many statistical tasks; these tools have been implemented in practice at major organizations
including Google [EPK14], Apple [Dif17], Microsoft [DKY17], and the U.S. Census Bureau [DLS+17].
1.1 Related Work
The only prior work on differentially private false discovery rate control (FDR) [DSZ18] considers the
traditional offline multiple testing problem, where an analyst has all the hypotheses and corresponding
p-values upfront. Their private procedure repeatedly applies the ReportNoisyMin mechanism [DR14] to
the celebrated Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure [BH95] in offline multiple testing to privately pre-screen
the p-values, and then applies the BH procedure again to select the significant p-values. The (non-private)
BH procedure first sorts all p-values, and then sequentially compares them to an increasing threshold, where
all p-values below their (ranked and sequential) threshold are rejected. The ReportNoisyMin mechanism
privatizes this procedure by repeatedly (and privately) finding the hypothesis with the lowest p-value.
Although the work of [DSZ18] showed that it was possible to integrate differential privacy with FDR
control in multiple hypothesis testing, the assumption of having all hypotheses and p-values upfront is not
reasonable in many practical settings. For example, a hospital may conduct multi-phase clinical trials where
more patients join over time, or a marketing company may perform A/B testings sequentially. In this
work, we focus on the more practical online hypothesis testing problem, where a stream of hypotheses arrive
sequentially, and decisions to reject hypotheses must be made based on current and previous results before
the next hypothesis arrives. This sequence of the hypotheses could be independent or adaptively chosen. Due
to the fundamental difference between the offline and online FDR procedures, the method of [DSZ18] cannot
be applied to the online setting.
The online multiple hypothesis testing problem was first investigated by [FS08], who proposed a framework
known as online alpha-investing procedure that models the hypothesis testing problem as an investment
problem. Some extensions based on this framework include generalized alpha-investing (GAI) [AR14], Level
based On Recent Discovery (LORD) [JM15, JM18], and the current state-of-the-art for online FDR control,
SAFFRON [RZWJ18] and ADDIS [TR19]. Further discussion of these approaches appears in Section 2.2.
1.2 Our Results
We develop a differentially private online FDR control procedure for multiple hypothesis testing, which takes
a stream of p-values and a target FDR level and privacy parameter ε, and outputs discoveries that can
control the FDR at a certain level at any time point. Such a procedure provides unconditional differential
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privacy guarantees (to ensure that privacy will be protected even in the worst case) and satisfy the theoretical
guarantees dictated by the FDR control problem.
Our algorithm, Private Alpha-investing P-value Rejecting Iterative sparse veKtor Algorithm (PAPRIKA,
Algorithm 3), is presented in Section 3. Its privacy and accuracy guarantees are stated in Theorem 4
and 5, respectively. While the full proofs appear in the appendix, we describe the main ideas behind the
algorithms and proofs in the surrounding prose. In Section 4, we provide a thorough empirical investigation
of PAPRIKA.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Background on Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy bounds the maximal amount that one data entry can change the output of the computation.
Databases belong to the space Dn and contain n entries–one for each individual–where each entry belongs to
data universe D. We say that D,D′ ∈ Dn are neighboring databases if they differ in at most one data entry.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). An algorithm M : Dn → R is (ε, δ)-differentially private
if for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ Rn, and for every subset of possible outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ. If δ = 0, we say that M is ε-differentially private.
The additive sensitivity of a real-valued query f : Dn → R is denoted ∆f , and is defined to be the
maximum change in the function’s value that can be caused by changing a single entry. That is,
∆f = max
D,D′ neighbors
|f(D)− f(D′)| .
If f is a vector-valued query, the expression above can be modified with the appropriate norm in place of
the absolute value. Differential privacy guarantees are often achieved by adding Laplace noise at various
places in the computation, where the noise scales with ∆f/ε. A Laplace random variable with parameter b is
denoted Lap(b), and has probability density function,
pLap(b)(x) =
1
2b
exp
(−|x|
b
)
∀x ∈ R.
We may sometimes abuse notation and also use Lap(b) to denote the realization of a random variable with
this distribution.
The SparseVector algorithm, first introduced by [DNPR10] and refined to its current form by [DR14],
privately reports the outcomes of a potentially very large number of computations, provided that only a few
are “significant.” It takes in a stream of queries, and releases a bit vector indicating whether or not each
noisy query answer is above the fixed noisy threshold. We use this algorithm as a framework for our online
private false discovery rate control algorithm as new hypotheses arrive online, and we only care about those
“significant” hypotheses when the p-value is below a certain threshold. We note that the standard presentation
below checks for queries with values above a threshold, but by simply changing signs this framework can be
used to check for values below a threshold, as we will do with the p-values.
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Algorithm 1 Sparse Vector: SparseVector(D,∆, {f1, f2, . . .}, T, c, ε)
Input: database D, stream of queries {f1, f2, . . .} each with sensitivity ∆, threshold T , a cutoff point c,
privacy parameter ε
Let Tˆ0 = T + Lap(
2∆c
ε )
Let count = 0
for each query i do
Let Zi ∼ Lap( 4∆cε )
if fi(X) + Zi > Tˆ then
Output ai = >
Let count = count +1
Let Tˆcount = T + Lap(
2∆c
ε )
else
Output ai = ⊥
end if
if count ≥ c then
Halt.
end if
end for
Theorem 1 ([DNPR10]). SparseVector is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Theorem 2 ([DNPR10]). For any sequence of k queries f1, . . . , fk with sensitivity ∆ such that |{i : fi(D) ≥
T − α}| ≤ c, SparseVector outputs with probability at least 1 − β a stream of a1, . . . , ak ∈ {>,⊥} such
that ai = ⊥ for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) < T − αSV and ai = > for every i ∈ [m] with f(i) > T + αSV as long
as αSV ≥ 8∆c log(2kc/β)ε .
Unlike the conventional use of additive sensitivity, [DSZ18] defined the notion of multiplicative sensitivity
specifically for p-values. It is motivated by the observation that, although the additive sensitivity of a p-value
may be large, the relative change of the p-value on two neighboring datasets is stable unless the p-value is
very small. Using this alternative sensitivity notion means that preserving privacy for these p-values only
requires a small amount of noise.
Definition 2 (Multiplicative Sensitivity [DSZ18]). A p-value function p is said to be (η, µ)-multiplicative
sensitive if for all neighboring databases D and D′, either both p(D), p(D′) ≤ µ or
exp(−η)p(D) ≤ p(D′) ≤ exp(η)p(D).
Specifically, when µ is sufficiently small, then we can treat the logarithm of the p-values as having additive
sensitivity η, and we only need to add noise that scales with η/ε, which may be much smaller than the noise
required under the standard additive sensitivity notion.
2.2 Background on Online False Discovery Rate Control
In the online false discovery rate (FDR) control problem, a data analyst receives a stream of hypotheses on
the database D, or equivalently, a stream of p-values p1, p2, . . .. The analyst must pick a threshold αt at
each time t to reject the hypothesis when pt ≤ αt; this threshold can depend on previous hypotheses and
discoveries, and rejection must be decided before the next hypothesis arrives.
The error metric is the false discovery rate, formally defined as:
FDR = E [FDP] = E
[ |H0 ∩R|
|R|
]
,
4
where H0 is the (unknown to the analyst) set of hypotheses where the null hypothesis is true, and R is the
set of rejected hypotheses. We will also write these terms as a function of time t to indicate their values after
the first t hypotheses: FDR(t), FDP(t), H0(t), R(t). The goal of FDR control is to guarantee that for any
time t, the FDR up to time t is less than a pre-determined quantity α ∈ (0, 1).
Such a problem was first investigated by [FS08], who proposed a framework known as online alpha-investing
that models the hypothesis testing problem as an investment problem. The analyst is endowed with an
initial budget, can test hypotheses at a unit cost, and receives an additional reward for each discovery. The
alpha-investing procedure ensures that the analysts always maintains an α-fraction of their wealth, and
can therefore continue testing future hypotheses indefinitely. Unfortunately, this approach only controls a
slightly relaxed version of FDR, known as mFDR, which is given by mFDR(t) =
E[|H0∩R|]
E[|R|] . This approach
was later extended to a class of generalized alpha-investing (GAI) rules [AR14]. One subclass of GAI rules,
the Level based On Recent Discovery (LORD), was shown to have consistently good performance in practice
[JM15, JM18]. The SAFFRON procedure, proposed by [RZWJ18], further improves the LORD procedures by
adaptively estimating the proportion of true nulls. The SAFFRON procedure is the current state-of-the-art
in online FDR control for multiple hypothesis testing.
To understand the main differences between the SAFFRON and the LORD procedures, we first introduce
an oracle estimate of the FDP as FDP∗(t) =
∑
j≤t,j∈H0 αj
|R(t)| . The numerator
∑
j≤t,j∈H0 αj overestimates
the number of false discoveries, so FDP∗(t) overestimates the FDP. The oracle estimator FDP∗(t) cannot
be calculated since H0 is unknown. LORD’s naive estimator ∑j≤t αj/|R(t)| is a natural overestimate of
FDP∗(t). The SAFFRON’s threshold sequence is based on a novel estimate of FDP as
F̂DPSAFFRON(t) =
∑
j≤t αj
I(pj>λj)
1−λj
|R(t)| , (1)
where {λj}∞j=1 is a sequence of user-chosen parameters in the interval (0, 1), which can be a constant or a
deterministic function of the information up to time t−1. This is a much better estimator than LORD’s naive
estimator
∑
j≤t αj/|R(t)|. The SAFFRON estimator is a fairly tight estimate of FDP∗(t), since intuitively
I(pj > λj)/(1− λj) has unit expectation under null hypotheses and is stochastically smaller than uniform
under non-null hypotheses.
The SAFFRON algorithm is given formally in Algorithm 2. SAFFRON starts off with an error budget
(1 − λ1)W0 < (1 − λ1)α, which will be allocated to different tests over time. It never loses wealth when
testing candidate p-values with pj < λj , and it earns back wealth of (1− λj)α on every rejection except for
the first. By construction, the SAFFRON algorithm controls F̂DPSAFFRON(t) to be less than α at any time
t. The function gt for defining the sequence {λj}∞j=1 can be any coordinatewise non-decreasing function. For
example, {λj}∞j=1 can be a deterministic sequence of constants, or λt = αt, as in the case of alpha-investing.
These λj values serve as a weak overestimate of αj . The algorithm first checks if a p-value is below λj , and if
so, adds it to the candidate set of hypotheses that may be rejected. It then computes the αj threshold based
on current wealth, current size of the candidate set, and the number of rejections so far, and decides to reject
the hypothesis if pj ≤ αj . It also takes in a non-increasing sequence of decay factors γj which sum to one.
These decay factors serve to depreciate past wealth and ensure that the sum of the wealth budget is always
below the desired level α.
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Algorithm 2 SAFFRON : SAFFRON(α,W0, {γj}∞j=0)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, target FDR level α, initial wealth W0 < α, positive non-increasing
sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to one.
for each p-value pt do
Set λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1)
Set the indicator for candidacy Ct = I(pt < λt). Set the candidates after the j-th rejection as
Cj+ =
∑t−1
i=τj+1
Ci
if t=1 then
Set α1 = (1− λ1)γ1W0
else
Compute αt = (1− λt)(W0γt−C0+ + (α−W0)γt−τ1−C1+ +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj−Cj+)
end if
Output Rt = I(pt ≤ αt)
end for
The SAFFRON algorithm requires that the input sequence of p-values are not too correlated under the
null hypothesis. This condition is formalized through a filtration on the sequence of candidacy and rejection
decisions. Intuitively, this means that the sequence of hypotheses cannot be too adaptively chosen, otherwise
the p-values may become overly correlated and violate this condition. Denote by Rj := I(pj ≤ αj) the
indicator for rejection, and let Cj := I(pj ≤ λj) be the indicator for candidacy. Define the filtration formed
by the sequences of σ-fields F t := σ(R1, . . . , Rt, C1, . . . , Ct), and let αt := ft(R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1),
where ft is an arbitrary function of the first t− 1 indicators for rejections and candidacy. We say that the
null p-values are conditionally super-uniformly distributed with respect to the filtration F if:
If null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ αt|F t−1) ≤ αt. (2)
We note that independent p-values is a special case of the conditional super-uniformity condition of (2).
When p-values are independent, they satisfy the following condition:
If the null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ u) ≤ u for all u ∈ [0, 1].
SAFFRON provides the following accuracy guarantees, where the first two conditions apply if p-values are
conditionally super-uniformly distributed, and the last two conditions apply if the p-values are additionally
independent under the null.
Theorem 3 ([RZWJ18]). If the null p-values are conditionally super-uniformly distributed, then we have:
(a) E
[∑
j≤t,j∈H0 αj
I(pj>λj)
1−λj
]
≥ E [|H0 ∩R(t)|];
(b) The condition F̂DPSAFFRON(t) for all t ∈ N implies that mFDR(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and of the non-null p-values, and {αt} and {λt} are
coordinatewise non-decreasing functions of the vector R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1, then
(c) E
[
F̂DPSAFFRON(t)
]
≥ E [FDP (t)] := FDR(t) for all t ∈ N;
(d) The condition F̂DPSAFFRON(t) for all t implies that FDR(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N.
3 Private online false discovery rate control
In this section, we provide our algorithm for private online false discovery rate control, Private Alpha-investing
P-value Rejecting Iterative sparse veKtor Algorithm (PAPRIKA), given formally in Algorithm 3. It is a
differentially private version of SAFFRON, where we use SparseVector to ensure privacy of our rejection
set. However, the combination of these tools is far from immediate for several reasons. Although the complete
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proofs of our privacy and accuracy results appear in the appendix, we elaborate here on the algorithmic
details and modifications needed to ensure privacy and FDR control.
Specifically, the SAFFRON algorithm decides to reject hypothesis t if the corresponding p-value pt is less
than the rejection threshold αt; that is, if pt ≤ αt. We instantiate the SparseVector framework in this
setting, where pt plays the role of the t
th query answer ft(X), and αt plays the role of the threshold. Note
that SparseVector uses a single fixed threshold for all queries, while our algorithm PAPRIKA allows for a
dynamic threshold. Our privacy analysis of the algorithm accounts for this change and shows that dynamic
thresholds do not affect the privacy guarantees of SparseVector.
Similar to prior work on private offline FDR control [DSZ18], we use the notion of multiplicative sensitivity
described in Definition 2, because p-values may have high sensitivity and therefore require unacceptably
large noise to be added to preserve privacy. We assume that our input stream of p-values p1, p2, . . . , each
has multiplicative sensitivity (η, µ). As long as µ is small enough (i.e., less than the rejection threshold),
we can treat the logarithm of the p-values as the queries with additive sensitivity η. Because of this
change, we must make rejection decisions based on the logarithm of the p-values, so our reject condition is
log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα for Laplace noise terms Zt, Zα drawn from the appropriate distributions.
The accuracy guarantees of SparseVector ensure that if a value is reported to be below threshold,
then with high probability it will not be more than αSV above the threshold. However, to ensure that
our algorithm satisfies the desired bound FDR ≤ α, we require that reports of “below threshold” truly do
correspond to p-values that are below the desired threshold αt. To accommodate this, we shift our rejection
threshold logαt down by a parameter A. A is chosen such that the algorithm to satisfy (ε, δ)-differential
privacy, but the choice can be seen as inspired by the αSV -accuracy term of SparseVector as given in
Theorem 2. Therefore our final reject condition is log pt + Zt ≤ logαt −A+ Zα. This ensures that “below
threshold” reports are below (logαt − A) + αSV ≈ logαt with high probability. Empirically, we see that
the bound of A in Theorem 4 may be overly conservative and lead to no hypotheses being rejected, so we
allow an additional scaling parameter s that will scale the magnitude of shift by a factor of s. The bounds
of Theorem 4 correspond to s = 4, but in many scenarios choosing a smaller value of s = 1 or 2 will lead
to better performance while still satisfy the privacy guarantee. Further analysis of how to chose this shift
parameter is given in Section 4.3.
Even with these modifications, a naive combination of SparseVector and SAFFRON would still not
satisfy differential privacy. This is due to the candidacy indicator step of the algorithm. In the SAFFRON
algorithm, a pre-processing candidacy step occurs before any rejection decisions. This step checks whether
each p-value pt is smaller than a loose upper bound λt on the eventual reject threshold αt. The algorithm
chooses αt using an α-investing rule that depends on the number of candidate hypotheses seen so far, and
ensures that αt ≤ λt, so only hypotheses in this candidate set can be rejected. These λ values are used to
control F̂DPSAFFRON(t) as defined in Equation (1), which serves as a conservative overestimate of FDP(t).
(For a discussion of how to choose λt, see Lemma 1 or our experimental results in Section 4. Reasonable
choices would be λt = αt or a small constant such as 0.2.)
Without adding noise to the candidacy condition, there may be neighboring databases with p-values
pt, p
′
t for some hypothesis such that log pt < log λt < log p
′
t, and hence the hypothesis would have positive
probability of being rejected under the first database and zero probability of rejection under the neighbor.
This would violate the (ε, 0)-differential privacy guarantee intended under SparseVector. If we were to
privatize the condition for candidacy using, for example, a parallel instantiation of SparseVector, then we
would have to reuse the same realizations of the noise when computing the rejection threshold αt to still
control FDP, but this would no longer be differentially private.
Since we cannot add noise to the candidacy condition, in PAPRIKA we instead make our candidacy
condition even weaker, to be log pt < log 2λt. Then if a hypothesis has different candidacy results under
neighboring databases and the multiplicative sensitivity η is small, then the hypothesis is still extremely
unlikely to be rejected even under the database for which it was candidate. To see this, consider a pair of
neighboring databases that induce p-values such that log pt < log 2λt < log p
′
t. Due to the multiplicative
sensitivity constraint, we know that log pt ≥ log 2λt−η. Plugging this into the rejection condition log pt+Zt ≤
logαt−A+Zα, we see that we would need the difference of the noise terms to satisfy Zt−Zα ≤ log 12 −A+η,
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which by analysis of the Laplace distribution, will happen with exponentially small probability in n when
η = poly−1(n).1 Our PAPRIKA algorithm is thus (ε, δ)-differentially private, and we account for this failure
probability in our (exponentially small) δ parameter, as stated in Theorem 4.
Our algorithm also controls at each time t,
F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤
∑
j≤t αt
I(pj>2λj)
1−2λj
|R(t)| . (3)
We note that this is equivalent to F̂DPSAFFRON(t) in Equation (1) by scaling down λj by a factor of 2. By
analyzing and bounding this expression, we achieve FDR bounds for our PAPRIKA algorithm, as stated in
Theorem 5.
Algorithm 3 Private Alpha-investing P-value Rejecting Iterative sparse veKtor Algorithm (PAPRIKA) :
PAPRIKA(α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s)
Input: stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .} with mutiplicative sensitivity (η,µ), target FDR level α, initial
wealth W0 < α, positive non-increasing sequence {γj}∞j=0 of summing to one, expected number of rejections
c, privacy parameters ε, δ, threshold shift magnitude s.
Let Z0α ∼ Lap(2ηc/ε), A = scηε log 23 min{δ,1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k} , count = 0
for each p-value pt do
Let Zt ∼ Lap(4ηc/ε)
Set λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1)
Set the indicator for candidacy Ct = I(log pt < log 2λt). Set the candidates after the j-th rejection as
Cj+ =
∑t−1
i=τj+1
Ci
if t = 1 then
Set α1 = (1− 2λ1)γ1W0
else
Compute αt = (1− 2λt)(W0γt−C0+ + (α−W0)γt−τ1−C1+ +
∑
j≥2 αγt−τj−Cj+)
end if
if Ct = 1 and log pt + Zt ≤ logαt −A+ Zcountα then
Output Rt = 1
count = count +1
Zcountα ∼ Lap(2ηc/ε)
else
Output Rt = 0
end if
if count ≥ c then
Halt
end if
end for
Theorem 4. For any stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, PAPRIKA(α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s) is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
As a starting point, our privacy comes from SparseVector, but as discussed above, many crucial
modifications are required. To briefly summarize the key considerations, we must handle different thresholds
at different times, multiplicative rather than additive sensitivity, a modified notion of the candidate set, and
introducing a small delta parameter to account for the new candidate set definition and the shift. The proof
of Theorem 4 appears in Appendix A.
1Such values of η are typical; see examples in Section 4 where η = 1√
n
. The shift term A also has dependence on η which
contributes to the bound.
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Next we describe the theoretical guarantees of FDR control for our private algorithm PAPRIKA which
is an analog of Theorem 3. We need to slightly modify the conditional super-uniformity assumption given in
(2) to incorporate the added Laplace noise. Let Rj := I(pj + Zj ≤ αj + Zα) be the rejection decisions, and
let Cj := I(pj ≤ 2λj) be the indicators for candidacy. We let αt := ft(R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1), where ft
is an arbitrary function of the first t− 1 indicators for rejections and candidacy. Define the filtration formed
by the sequences of σ-fields F ′t := σ(R1, . . . , Rt, C1, . . . , Ct, Z1, . . . , Zt, Zα). We say that the null p-values
are conditionally super-uniformly distributed with respect to the filtration F ′ if:
If the null hypothesis Hi is true, then Pr(pt ≤ αt|F ′t−1) ≤ αt. (4)
Our FDR control guarantees for PAPRIKA mirror those of SAFFRON (Theorem 3). The first two
conditions apply if p-values are conditionally super-uniformly distributed, and the last two conditions apply
if the p-values are additionally independent under the null.
Theorem 5. If the null p-values are conditionally super-uniformly distributed, then we have:
(a) E
[∑
j≤t,j∈H0 αj
I(pj>2λj)
1−2λj
]
≥ E [|H0 ∩R(t)|];
(b)The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N implies that mFDR(t) ≤ α+ δt for all t ∈ N.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and of the non-null p-values, and {αt} and {λt} are
coordinate-wise non-decreasing functions of the vector R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1, then
(c) E
[
F̂DPPAPRIKA(t)
]
≥ E [FDP (t)] := FDR(t) for all t ∈ N;
(d) The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t implies that FDR(t) ≤ α+ δt for all t ∈ N.
This statement can be compared with the guarantees of SAFFRON (Theorem 3). Similar to before, the
first two conditions provide a bound on mFDR, whereas the latter two conditions bound FDR when we have
independence of the p-values. In contrast to the non-private guarantees, we have a slack term of δt in the
FDR bound. However, since δ will generally be cryptographically small in most applications, this will be
have a negligible effect on the FDR. The proof of Theorem 5 appears in Appendix B.
The following lemma is a key tool in the proof of Theorem 5. Though it is qualitatively similar to Lemma
2 in [RZWJ18], it is crucially modified to show an analogous statement holds under the addition of Laplace
noise. Its proof appears in Section C.
Lemma 1. Assume p1, p2, . . . are independent of each other and let h : {0, 1}k → R to be any coordinate-
wise non-decreasing function. Assume ft and gt are coordinate-wise non-decreasing functions and that
αt = ft(R1:t−1, C1:t−1) and λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1). Then for any t ≤ k such that Ht ∈ H0, we have
E
[
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R1:k) |F
′t−1
]
≥ E
[
αt
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
,
and
E
[
min{αt exp(Zα − Zt −A), 1}
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
≥ E
[
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
.
4 Experiments
In this section, we provide experimental results that compare the performance of variations of the PAPRIKA
and SAFFRON procedures. In particular, we evaluate the FDR and the statistical power of each algorithm
under two different sequences of {γj}: one uses a constant sequence γj = 0.2, and the other one sets γj = αj .
We refer to the latter case with an AI suffix (PAPRIKA AI and SAFFRON AI, respectively) to indicate
that the choice of γj corresponds to the Alpha Investing (AI) rule. We generally observe that, even under
moderately stringent privacy restrictions, PAPRIKA’s performance is comparable to that of the non-private
alternatives. Throughout our experiments, we set δ = 0.2/800 = 2.5× 10−4, and all the results are averaged
over 100 runs.
9
We investigate two settings: in Section 4.1, the observations come Bernoulli distributions, and in Section 4.2,
the observations are generated from truncated exponential distributions. In Section 4.3, we discuss our choice
of the shift parameter A and give guidance on how to choose this parameter in practice. Code for PAPRIKA
and our experiments is available at https://github.com/wanrongz/PAPRIKA.
4.1 Testing with Bernoulli Observations
In this setting, we assume that we have n individuals in a database D, and that each individual’s data
contains k independent entries. The ith entries are associated with n i.i.d. Bernoulli variables ξi1, . . . , ξ
i
n, each
of which takes the value 1 with probability θi, and takes the value 0 otherwise. Let ti be the sum of the ith
entries. A p-value for testing null hypothesis Hi0 : θi ≤ 1/2 against Hi1 : θi > 1/2 is given by,
pi(D) =
n∑
k=ti
1
2n
(
n
k
)
.
[DSZ18] showed that pi is (µ, η)-multiplicatively sensitive for µ = m
−1−c and η 
√
logn
n , where m ≤ poly(n)
and c is any small positive constant. We choose θi for our experiments as follows:
θi =
{
0.5 with probability 1− pi1
0.75 with probability pi1,
where we vary the parameter pi1, corresponding to the expected fraction of non-nulls.
In the following experiments, we sequentially test Hi0 versus H
i
1 for i = 1, . . . , k. We use n = 1000 as the size
of the database D, and k = 800 as the number of entries as well as the number of hypotheses. Our experiments
are run under several different shifts A, but we only report results with A = cηε log
2
3 min{δ,1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}
(i.e., when s = 1). Further discussion on the choice of A is deferred to Section 4.3. The results are summarized
in Figure 1, which plots the false discovery rate (FDR) against the expected fraction of non-nulls, pi1. We
evaluate the performance of PAPRIKA under two different sequences of {γj}: γj = αj and γj = 0.2,
denoted by PAPRIKA AI and PAPRIKA, respectively. The non-private baseline methods are LORD in
[JM15, JM18], Alpha-investing in [AR14], and SAFFRON and SAFFRON AI in [RZWJ18]. In Figure 1(a)
and (b), we compare our algorithm with the baseline methods with privacy parameter ε = 5. In Figure 1(c,d)
and (e,f), we compare the performance of PAPRIKA AI and PAPRIKA, respectively, with varying privacy
parameters ε = 3, 5, 10.
As expected, the performance of PAPRIKA generally diminishes as ε decreases. A notable exception is
that FDR also decreases in Figure 1(c). This phenomenon is because we set λj = αj , resulting in a smaller
candidacy set and leading to insufficient rejections. Surprisingly, PAPRIKA AI also gives a lower FDR as
compared with other non-private algorithms (Figure 1(a)), since it tends to make fewer rejections. We also
see that PAPRIKA AI performs dramatically better than PAPRIKA, suggesting that the choice of setting
γj = αj is a natural choice to ensure good performance in practice.
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Figure 1: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-null hypotheses pi1 for PAPRIKA and non-private
algorithms using two different sequences {λj} when the database consists of Bernoulli observations. The first row plots
the comparisons of FDR and power of PAPRIKAwith privacy parameter ε = 5 with other non-private algorithms.
The second row plots the FDR and power of PAPRIKA with λj = αj (which we refer to as PAPRIKA AI) with
privacy parameters ε = 3, 5, 10. The third row plots the FDR and power of PAPRIKA with λj = 0.2 with privacy
parameters ε = 3, 5, 10.
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4.2 Testing with Truncated Exponential Observations
In this section, we also assume that have n individuals in the database D. Each individual’s data contains
k independent entries. Here the ith entries are associated with n i.i.d. truncated exponential distributed
variables ξi1, . . . , ξ
i
n, each of which is sampled according to the density function,
fi(x | θi, b) = θi exp(−θix)
1− exp(−bθi)I(0 ≤ x ≤ b),
for positive parameters b and θi. Let ti be the realized sum of the ith entries, and let Ti denote the random
variable of the sum ith entries, corresponding to the n truncated exponential distributed variables. A p-value
for testing the null hypothesis Hi0 : θi = 1 against the alternative hypothesis H
i
1 : θi > 1 is given by,
pi(D) = Pr
θi=1
(Ti > ti).
[DSZ18] showed that pi is (µ, η)-multiplicatively sensitive for µ = m
−1−c and η 
√
logn
n , where m ≤ poly(n)
and c is any small positive constant.
In the following experiments, we generate our database using the exponential distribution model truncated
at b = 1. We set θi as follows:
θi =
{
1 with probability 1− pi1
1.95 with probability pi1,
where we vary the parameter pi1, corresponding to the expected fraction of non-nulls.
We sequentially test Hi0 versus H
i
1 for i = 1, . . . , k. We use n = 1000 as the size of the database D, and
k = 800 as the number of entries as well as the number of hypotheses. We note that there is no closed form
to compute the p-values, however, the sum of n = 1000 i.i.d. samples is approximately normally distributed
by the Central Limit Theorem. The expectation and the variance of ξij with b = 1 are
E
[
ξij
]
=
1
θi
+
1
1− exp(θi) , and
Var[ξij ] =
1
θ2i
− exp(θi)
(exp(θi)− 1)2 ,
respectively. Therefore, Ti is approximately distributed as N (nE
[
ξij
]
, nVar[ξij ]), and we compute the p-values
accordingly. We run the experiments with shift A = cηε log
2
3 min{δ,1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k} (shift magnitude s = 1).
The results are summarized in Figure 2.
All of the methods perform well in this setting. To illustrate the process, we also plot the rejection
threshold αt and wealth versus the hypothesis index in Figure 3. Each “jump” of the wealth corresponds to a
rejection. We observe that the rejections of our private algorithms are consistent with the rejections of the
non-private algorithms, another perspective which empirically confirms their accuracy.
One explanation for the good performance observed in Figure 2 could be that the signal between the null
and alternative hypotheses as parameterized by θi could be very strong, which means the algorithms could
easily discriminate between the true null and true non-null hypotheses based on the observed p-values. To
measure this, we also varied the value of θi in the alternative hypotheses. These results are shown in Figure
4, which plots FDR and power of PAPRIKA and PAPRIKA AI with when the alternative hypotheses have
parameter θi = 1.80, 1.90, 2.00. As expected, the performance gets better as we increase the signal, and we
observe that when the signal is too weak (θi = 1.80), performance begins to decline.
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Figure 2: FDR and statistical power versus fraction of non-null hypotheses pi1 for PAPRIKAand non-private
algorithms using two different sequences {λj} when the database consists of truncated exponential observations. The
first row plots the comparisons of FDR and power of PAPRIKA with privacy parameter ε = 5 with other non-private
algorithms. The second row plots the FDR and power of PAPRIKA AI with λj = αj under privacy parameters
ε = 3, 5, 10. The third row plots the FDR and power of PAPRIKA with λj = 0.2 under privacy parameters ε = 3, 5, 10.
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Figure 3: Wealth and rejection threshold αt versus hypothesis index with privacy parameter ε = 5 when the database
consists of truncated exponential observations. PAPRIKA AI and SAFFRON AI used λj = αj , PAPRIKA used
λj = 0.2, and SAFFRON used λj = 0.5.
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Figure 4: FDR and statistical power versus expected fraction of non-null hypotheses pi1 under various choices of
signal θi = 1.80, 1.90, 2.00 for alternative hypothesis parameters. The privacy parameter is ε = 5, and the database
consists of truncated exponential observations. The first row shows performance of PAPRIKA AI where λj = αj , and
the second row shows performance of PAPRIKA where λj = 0.2.
4.3 Choice of shift A
We now discuss how to choose the shift parameter A. Theorem 4 gives a theoretical lower bound for A in
terms of the privacy parameter δ, but this bound may be overly conservative. Since the shift A is closely
related to the performance of FDR and statistical power, we wish to pick a value of A that yields good
performance in practice. In Theorem 5, we show that FDR(t) is less than our desired bound α plus the
privacy parameter δt, which naturally requires that the privacy loss parameter δ be small.
We use the Bernoulli example in Section 4.1 to investigate the performance under different choices of the
shift A with privacy parameter ε = 5. The results are summarized in Figure 5, which plots the FDR and
power versus the expected fraction of non-nulls when we vary the shift size with s = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2.
Larger shifts (corresponding to larger values of s) will lower the rejection threshold, which causes fewer
hypotheses to be rejected. This improves FDR of the algorithm, but harms Power, as the threshold may be
too low to reject true nulls. Figure 5 shows that the shift size parameter s should be chosen by the analyst to
balance the tradeoff between FDR and Power, as demanded by the application.
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Figure 5: FDR and statistical power versus expected fraction of non-null hypotheses pi1 under various choices of shift
magnitude s. The privacy parameter is ε = 5, and the database consists of Bernoulli observations. The first row shows
performance of PAPRIKA AI where λj = αj , and the second row shows performance of PAPRIKA where λj = 0.2.
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Before proving Theorem 4, we will state and prove the following lemma, which will be useful in the proofs of
Theorem 4 and Theorem 5.
Lemma 2. If Z1 ∼ Lap(2b), Z2 ∼ Lap(b) and C > 0 is a constant, we have Pr(Z1 ≥ Z2 − C) = 1 −
2
3 exp(− C2b ) + 16 exp(−C/b).
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Proof.
Pr(Z1 ≥ Z2 − C) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
x−C
1
4b
exp(−|y|
2b
)
1
2b
exp(−|x|
b
)dydx
=
∫ C
∞
(1− 1
2
exp(−|x− C|
2b
))
1
2b
exp(−|x|
b
)dx+
∫ ∞
C
1
2
exp(−|x− C|
2b
)
1
2b
exp(−|x|
b
)dx
=
∫ C
−∞
1
2b
exp(−|x|
b
)dx−
∫ 0
−∞
1
4b
exp(−|3x− C|
2b
)dx
−
∫ C
0
1
4b
exp(−C + x
2b
)dx+
∫ ∞
C
1
4b
exp(−|3x− C|
2b
)dx
= 1− 1
2
exp(−C
b
)− 1
6
exp(−C
2b
)− 1
2
exp(−C
2b
) +
1
2
exp(−C
b
) +
1
6
exp(−C
b
)
= 1− 2
3
exp(−C
2b
) +
1
6
exp(−C
b
)
Theorem 4. For any stream of p-values {p1, p2, . . .}, PAPRIKA(α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s) is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
Proof. Fix any two neighboring databases D and D′. Let R denote the random variable representing the
output of PAPRIKA(D,α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s) and let R′ denote the random variable representing the
output of PAPRIKA(D′, α, λ,W0, {γj}∞j=0, c, ε, δ, s). Let k denote the total number of hypotheses. When
log pt ≥ log 2λ and log p′t ≥ log 2λ for all t, Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) = 1 = Pr(R′ = {0, 0, . . . , 0}). When
log pt < log 2λ and log p
′
t < log 2λ for all t, privacy follows from the privacy of SparseVector. For other
cases, the worst case is that for all t, log pt < log 2λ and log p
′
t ≥ log 2λ. In this setting, we have
Pr(R′ = r) =
{
1 if r = {0, 0, . . . , 0}
0 otherwise.
To satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy, we need to bound the probability of outputting r for database D. We
first consider r = {0, 0 . . . , 0}. We wish to bound Pr(R′ = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) + δ
and Pr(R = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R′ = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) + δ. The latter is trivial since exp(ε) Pr(R′ =
{0, 0, . . . , 0}) + δ = exp(ε) + δ, which is greater than 1. It remains to satisfy Pr(R′ = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) ≤
exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}) + δ, which is equivalent to 1− δ ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R = {0, 0, . . . , 0}). We have
Pr(R = {0, 0 . . . , 0}) = Pr(R1 = 0) Pr(R2 = 0|R1 = 0) . . .Pr(Rk = 0|Rk−1 = 0)
=
k∏
t=1
Pr(log pt + Zt ≥ logαt −A+ Zα)
>
k∏
t=1
Pr(log 2λ− η + Zt ≥ logαt −A+ Zα) (5)
=
k∏
t=1
Pr(Zt ≥ Zα + logαt − log 2λ+ η −A)
=
k∏
t=1
(
1− 2
3
exp(−ε(A+ log(2λ/αt)− η)
4ηc
) +
1
6
exp(−ε(A+ log(2λ/αt)− η)
2ηc
)
(6)
≥
(
1− 2
3
exp(−ε(A+ log 2− η)
4ηc
)
)k
, (7)
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where Inequality (5) is because the worst case happens when pt is η below the candidacy threshold log 2λ,
Equation (6) applies Lemma 2, and Inequality (7) follows from the facts that αt ≤ λ for all t and that the
third term in (6) is positive. Setting (7) to be larger than (1− δ)/ exp(ε), we have,
2
3
exp
(
−ε(A+ log 2− η)
4ηc
)
≤ 1−
(
1− δ
exp(ε)
) 1
k
. (8)
Next, we consider all other possible outputs r. Define the set S := {r | there exists a t such that rt = 1}.
We wish to bound Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R′ ∈ S) + δ and Pr(R′ ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε) Pr(R ∈ S) + δ. The latter is
trivial since Pr(R′ ∈ S) = 0. It remains to bound Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ δ. For any t, we have
Pr(R ∈ S) ≤ Pr(Rt = 1)
= Pr(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt −A+ Zα)
≤ Pr(log 2λ+ Zt ≤ logαt −A+ Zα) (9)
= Pr(Zt ≤ Zα − (log(2λ/αt) +A))
≤ Pr(Zt ≤ Zα − (log 2 +A))
=
2
3
exp
(
−ε(A+ log 2)
4ηc
)
− 1
6
exp
(
−ε(A+ log 2)
2ηc
)
(10)
≤ 2
3
exp
(
−ε(A+ log 2)
4ηc
)
, (11)
where Inequality (9) is because the worst case occurs when log pt = log 2λ, Equality (10) applies Lemma 2,
and Inequality (11) follows from the facts that αt ≤ λ for all t and that the second term in (10) is negative.
Setting (11) to be less than δ, we have,
2
3
exp
(
−ε(A+ log 2)
4ηc
)
≤ δ. (12)
Combining Equations (12) and (8), we have the condition that 23 exp
(
− ε(A+log 2−η)4ηc
)
≤ min{δ, 1 − ((1 −
δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}.
Rearranging this inequality for A gives
A ≥ 4ηc
ε
(
log
2
3 min{δ, 1− ((1− δ)/ exp(ε))1/k} − log 2 + η
)
,
which is how the shift term A is set in PAPRIKA.
B Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. If the null p-values are conditionally super-uniformly distributed, then we have:
(a) E
[∑
j≤t,j∈H0 αj
I(pj>2λj)
1−2λj
]
≥ E [|H0 ∩R(t)|];
(b)The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t ∈ N implies that mFDR(t) ≤ α+ δt for all t ∈ N.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and of the non-null p-values, and {αt} and {λt} are
coordinate-wise non-decreasing functions of the vector R1, . . . , Rt−1, C1, . . . , Ct−1, then
(c) E
[
F̂DPPAPRIKA(t)
]
≥ E [FDP (t)] := FDR(t) for all t ∈ N;
(d) The condition F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α for all t implies that FDR(t) ≤ α+ δt for all t ∈ N.
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Proof. For any time t > 0, we bound the number of false rejections as follows:
E
[|H0 ∩R(t)|] = ∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E [I(log pj + Zj ≤ logαj −A+ Zα)]
≤
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
Pr(log pj ≤ logαj) + Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A)
≤
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E [αj ] + Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A) (13)
where Inequality (13) follows from the conditional super-uniformity property. We bound each term in (13)
separately. Using the law of iterated expectations by conditioning on F ′t−1, we can bound the first term of
(13) as follows:
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E [αj ] ≤E
 ∑
j≤t,j∈H0
αjE
[
I(pj > 2λj)
1− 2λj |F
′t−1
]
=E
E
 ∑
j≤t,j∈H0
αj
I(pj > 2λj)
1− 2λj |F
′t−1

=E
 ∑
j≤t,j∈H0
αj
I(pj > 2λj)
1− 2λj
 , (14)
where Equation (14) applies the conditional super-uniformity. Since F̂DPPAPRIKA(t) ≤ α, we have,
E
 ∑
j≤t,j∈H0
αj
I(pj > 2λj)
1− 2λj
 ≤ αE [|R(t)|] .
Next, we bound the second term in (13) as follows:∑
j≤t,j∈H0
Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A) ≤2t
3
exp
(
− Aε
4ηc
)
− t
6
exp
(
− Aε
2ηc
)
≤tmin
{
δ, 1−
(
1− δ
exp(ε)
) 1
k
}
.
Combining this inequality with (14), we bound mFDR as
mFDR :=
E
[|H0 ∩R(t)|]
E [|R(t)|]
≤α+ 1
E [|R(t)|]
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A)
≤α+ min
{
δ, 1−
(
1− δ
exp(ε)
) 1
k
}
t
≤α+ δt.
If the null p-values are independent of each other and the non-nullls, and {αt} is a coordinate-wise
non-decreasing function of the vector R1, . . . , Rt−1, then we have
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FDR(t) = E
[ |H0 ∩R(t)|
|R(t)|
]
=
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E
[
I(log pj + Zj ≤ logαj −A+ Zα)
|R(t)|
]
≤
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E
[
min{αj exp(Zα − Zj −A), 1}
|R(t)|
]
(15)
≤
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E
[
αj
|R(t)|
]
+ Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A), (16)
where Inequality (15) applies the law of iterated expectations by conditioning on F ′t−1 and Lemma 1. Inequal-
ity (16) follows by a case analysis: if Zj > Zα−A, then exp(Zα−Zj−A) < 1, and thus min{αj exp(Zα−Zj−A),1}|R(t)|
reduces to
αj
|R(t)| . On the other hand, if Zj ≤ Zα −A, then min{αj exp(Zα−Zj−A),1}|R(t)| ≤ 1|R(t)| ≤ 1, allowing us
to upper bound the expectation by the probability of this event.
We bound the first term in (16) as follows:∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E
[
αj
|R(t)|
]
≤
∑
j≤t,j∈H0
E
[
αjI(pj > 2λj)
(1− 2λj)|R(t)|
]
(17)
≤ E
[∑
j≤t αjI(pj > 2λj)
(1− 2λj)|R(t)|
]
= E
[
F̂DPPAPRIKA(t)
]
≤ α, (18)
where Inequality (17) applies Lemma 1.
It remains to bound the second term in (16), which we do using Lemma 2 as follows:∑
j≤t,j∈H0
Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A) ≤
∑
j≤t
Pr(Zj ≤ Zα −A)
=
2t
3
exp(− Aε
4ηc
)− t
6
exp(− Aε
2ηc
)
≤ min
{
δ, 1−
(
1− δ
exp(ε)
) 1
k
}
t. (19)
Combining (18) and (19), we reach the conclusion that FDR(t) ≤ α+min{δ, 1−((1−δ)/ exp(ε))1/k}t ≤ α+δt.
C Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Assume p1, p2, . . . are independent of each other and let h : {0, 1}k → R to be any coordinate-
wise non-decreasing function. Assume ft and gt are coordinate-wise non-decreasing functions and that
αt = ft(R1:t−1, C1:t−1) and λt = gt(R1:t−1, C1:t−1). Then for any t ≤ k such that Ht ∈ H0, we have
E
[
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R1:k) |F
′t−1
]
≥ E
[
αt
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
,
and
E
[
min{αt exp(Zα − Zt −A), 1}
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
≥ E
[
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2 in [RZWJ18] with the addition of i.i.d. Laplace noise.
In a high level, we hallucinate a vector of p-values that are same as the original vector of p-values, except
for the t-th index. This allows us to apply the conditional uniformity property, since now pt is independent of
the hallucinated rejections. We then connect the original rejections and the hallucinated rejections by the
monotonicity of the rejections.
We perform our analysis using a hallucinated process: let p˜t1:k be a copy of p1:k that is identical everywhere
except for the t-th p-value which is set to be 1. That is,
p˜i =
{
1 if i = t
pi otherwise.
Also let the hallucinated Laplace noises Z˜t1:k be an identical copy of Z1:k, and let Z˜α be an identical copy
of Zα. The t-th value of Z˜
t
1:k can be arbitrary since we have ensure the event {p˜t > 2λt}, so it will fail to
become a candidate and the values of Z˜t will not be relevant. We denote C˜1:k and R˜1:k as the candidates
and rejections made using p˜t1:k, Z˜
t
1:k, and Z˜α.
By construction, we have R˜1:t−1 = R1:t−1. On the event {pt > 2λt}, we have Rt = R˜t = 0 and Ct = C˜t = 0
because p˜t = 1, so both will fail to become candidates, and hence we have R˜1:k = R1:k and the following
equation holds:
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R1:k) =
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R˜1:k)
.
We note that when pt ≤ 2λt, the above equation still holds since both sides will be zero. Since R˜t1:k is
independent of pt, we have
E
[
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R1:k) |F
′t−1
]
= E
[
αtI(pt > 2λt)
(1− 2λt)h(R˜1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
≥ E
[
αt
h(R˜1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
(20)
≥ E
[
αt
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
(21)
where Inequality (20) is obtained by taking the expectation only with respect to pt by invoking the conditional
super-uniformity property and independence of pt and h(R˜1:k), and Inequality (21) follows from the facts
that Ri ≥ R˜i for all i and that the function h is non-decreasing.
For the second inequality in the lemma statement, we hallucinate a vector of p-values p¯t1:k that equals
p1:k everywhere except for the t-th p-value which is set to be 0. That is,
p¯i =
{
0 if i = t
pi otherwise.
Also let the hallucinated Laplace noises Z¯t1:k be an identical copy of Z1:k, and let Z¯α be an identical copy of
Zα. We denote C¯1:k and R¯1:k as the candidates and rejections made using p¯
t
1:k and Z¯
t
1:k. By construction,
we have R¯i = Ri and C¯i = Ci for all i < t. On the event that {log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A}, since p¯t = 0
and we inject the same Laplace noise, we have R¯t = Rt = 1 and C¯t = Ct = 1, and hence also R¯1:k = R1:k.
Then the following equation holds:
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R1:k)
=
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R¯1:k)
.
We note that when log pt + Zt > logαt + Zα −A, the above equation still holds since both sides will be zero.
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Since R¯1:k and Zt, Zα are independent of pt, we can take conditional expectations to obtain
E
[
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
= E
[
I(log pt + Zt ≤ logαt + Zα −A)
h(R¯1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
≤ E
[
min{αt exp(Zα − Zt −A), 1})
h(R¯1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
(22)
≤ E
[
min{αt exp(Zα − Zt −A), 1})
h(R1:k)
|F ′t−1
]
, (23)
where Inequality (22) follows by taking expectation only with respect to pt by invoking the conditional
uniformity property and the fact that the support of p-values is [0, 1], and Inequality (23) follows from the
facts that h(R1:k) ≤ h(R¯1:k) since Ri ≤ R¯i for all i and that the function h is non-decreasing.
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